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BOOK REVIEW:
THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE COST OF
THE IRAQ CONFLICT
Joseph E. Stiglitz & Linda J. Bilmes*
Reviewed By: Bruce Patsner
The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict is
the ultimate reality check. For the past six years, the Bush
administration has been very successful at keeping the American
people from seeing photographs of American soldiers killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Our dead and wounded are airlifted here from Europe
and land in the middle of night at military bases, far from the prying
eyes of the press. However, no amount of information control is going
to help politicians run from the ever-increasing, overwhelming
economic catastrophe the current Iraq war has become for this country,
not just in terms of the unanticipated costs of caring for the seriously
wounded and injured (now numbering more than 58,000)1 and long-
term disabled veterans, but also because of the sheer enormity of the
financial expenditure. Even by conservative estimates, the costs of
veterans' healthcare for this conflict will in all likelihood equal or
exceed the $800 billion spent on this conflict, since the "Shock and
Awe" campaign kicked it off six years ago.
The dollar numbers are staggering, the sheer wastefulness mind-
numbing, and the manner in which medical care for our warriors is
administered once they are state-side depressing. Worse still is the fact
that the authors-a 2001 Nobel Prize winning economist and a skilled
expert in government finance from the Harvard University's Kennedy
School of Government-repeatedly emphasize that some of their cost
* JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE
TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (W.W. NORTON & COMPANY 2008).
** M.D., J.D. Research Professor, Health Law and Policy Group, University of
Houston Law Center
1 DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, STATISTICAL INFORMATION ANALYSIS
CENTER, GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM - OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, BY CASUALTY
CATEGORY WITHIN SERVICE, MARCH 19, 2003 THROUGH DECEMBER 8, 2007,
obtained by Veterans for Common Sense under the Freedom of Information Act,
available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/OIF-Total.pdf (last
accessed March 10, 2008).
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estimates are conservative. This book should be required reading for
every American old enough to vote this election year.
As a work of major healthcare economics research, The Three
Trillion Dollar War is likely to be the definitive source for some time.
Readers may or may not be surprised at how difficult it was for skilled
economics researchers, such as the authors, to obtain even basic
information needed for many of the cost calculations in this book.
What is surprising is that some of the authors' success was in no small
part due to repetitive requests for information by veterans' interest
groups,3 under the Freedom of Information Act.
I. THE TWO TAKE-HOME MESSAGES
The first message Stiglitz and Bilmes have for the reader-and
they hit this point repeatedly-is that there is no free lunch. More
specifically, there is no free war. The fact is that wars cost money, and
our current war has been extremely expensive by any standard. The
butcher's bill (as Napoleon would say) may be small compared to
World War I, World War II, Korea, or Vietnam, 4 but Americans are
going to be paying off the tab for many years to come. Unlike other
wars the U.S. has fought in the past 100 years, the financing of the
current conflict has been with money borrowed from overseas. Instead
of raising taxes so that American citizens were aware of the direct costs
of this war and its long-term veterans' healthcare consequences, the
current Bush administration cut taxes for Americans and shifted the
burden for paying off our war debt to future generations. For this
reason, there has been little direct effect of the war on the day to day
lives of most Americans, and most Americans remain oblivious to the
direct financial, and personal, costs of the war.
The total amount of money Congress has thus far appropriated
and that the military has spent as of this writing is approximately $845
2 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE
TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (W.W. NORTON & COMPANY 2008) [hereinafter
abbreviated as Stiglitz and Bilmes].
3 See Veterans for America, available at http://www.veteransforamerica.org (last
accessed March 31, 2008). This website tracks trends in the healthcare provided to
Gulf War veterans suffering fiom Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD).
4 STIGLITZ & BILMES, supra note 2, at 240 ("CRS estimates the military costs (in FY
2007 dollars) of previous wars as: Vietnam $670 billion; Korean War $295 billion;
and Gulf War $94 billion (total costs, mostly paid by allies). These are military costs,
not including veterans' medical care and disability compensation.").
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billion dollars. 5 Three-quarters of that money ($634 billion) is just for
Iraq. How much money is that exactly? Treasure of such magnitude is
hard to comprehend. It is ten times the Bush administration's early
estimates for the Iraq war6 and exceeds the amount we spend on
Medicare and Medicaid combined each year.7  Looking at the
possibilities for what this amount of money might have been used for in
non-healthcare items, the figures border on the fantastic. 8 The recent
month-long dispute between Congress and the President over
expansion of SCHIP coverage so more poor children in this country
could receive medical care9 revolved around an amount of money that
would not run military operations in Iraq for more than a few days. On
the other hand, given the amount of waste and cost-overruns, which
routinely inhabit the world of the Pentagon,10 others might view what
we have spent on current military operations as nothing out of the
ordinary.
Reading this book in 2008, it is difficult to imagine that the
Bush administration actually claimed six years ago that the war would
cost "only" $50-60 billion dollars and that revenue from oil would
ultimately defray our costs." U.S. gasoline prices are almost double
what they were five years ago when this conflict started, and there is no
evidence that any real Iraqi oil revenue is being used to payback
anything. If the real reason for going to war in the Gulf was to get
cheap oil (something the authors believe to be unlikely and dismiss in
5 STIGLITZ & BILMES, supra note 2, at 32.
6 Id. at 7. Larry Lindsey, head of the National Economic Council, initially suggested
that the total cost of the war might reach $200 billion. This estimate was dismissed as
"baloney" by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld who estimated the costs in the $50-60
billion dollar range. Rumsfeld's deputy Paul Wolfowitz stated that post-war
reconstruction could pay for itself through increased oil revenues. This has yet to
happen. Interestingly, the first Iraq War under President Bush Senior was paid for
mostly by our allies, unlike the current Iraq war.
7 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (2007). Included $394 billion for Medicare and
$276 billion for Medicaid.
8 See STIGLITZ & BILMES, supra note 2, at preface ("A trillion dollars could have built
8 million additional housing units, could have hired some 15 million additional public
school teachers for one year; could have paid for 120 million children to attend a year
of Head Start; or insured 530 million children for health care for one year.").
9 Sara Rosenbaum, The Proxy War-SCHIP and the Government's Role in Health
Care Reform, 358 N. ENG. J. MED. 869 (2008).
10 See Dana Hedgpeth, GAO blasts weapons budget. Cost overruns hit $295 billion
for dozens of Pentagon's biggest systems. THE WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 1, 2008,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23891322/print/l/displaymode/I 098/ (last
accessed April 1, 2008).
" Stiglitz & Bilmes, supra note 2, at 7.
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Chapter Five "The Macroeconomic Effects of the War"), our efforts
and expense, thus far, have been an appalling failure.' 2 President Bush
recently stated that he is comfortable with the expenditure in lives and
national treasure for his policies;' 3 perhaps, he should put down his
book about George Washington long enough to read this one. Except
for Barack Obama, none of the current Presidential candidates have
directly pointed out what many Americans are belatedly figuring out
for themselves: some of the current economic woes in this country are
because of the money we have spent on this war. Every dollar spent on
the war is a dollar that is not spent on domestic concerns. The non-
intuitive notion of "opportunity costs," which is nothing more than
economic shorthand for asking whether we are getting sufficient value
for the money we are spending on something (as opposed to anything
else), is now beginning to rear its ugly head. A recent Op-Ed piece by
Nicholas D. Kristof, in the New York Times, 14 pointed out that Iraq
war-related expenses are accumulating at the rate of almost $5000 per
second.
The second, and most important, message of this book is that
there is no free medical care. According to the authors, even if we take
into account the costs of overhauling our military and the direct
expenses on personnel and equipment spent thus far, the most serious
and long-term direct financial obligations for American taxpayers are
going to be the current and future costs for medical care, disability
benefits, social security payments, and lost earnings for the veterans of
this conflict and their families. This second point is the real surprise of
the book, because at first glance one would not normally view the
major costs of the Gulf war through the prism of healthcare economics.
Although every chapter in the book makes this second point, and a
breakdown of relative costs is nicely summarized in a table at the end
of Chapter Two ("The Costs to the Nation's Budget"), it is Chapter
Three ("The True Cost of Caring for Our Veterans") that is the critical
"core" of the book where the authors detail their economic analysis and
make their case.
12 Id. In Chapter 5, the authors note "It is enough to say that if America went to war in
the hope of securing cheap oil, we failed miserably. We did however succeed in
making the oil companies richer."
13 Karen DeYoung & Michael Abramowitz, Bush Says War's Outcome 'Will Merit
the Sacrifice', WASH. POST, March 25, 2008 at Al.
14 Nicholas D. Kristof, Iraq, $5000 Per Second, THE NEW YORK TIMEs, March 23,
2008, WK at 10.
[Vol. 11. 3:35 9
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The Preface and Chapter One ("Is It Really Three Trillion?")
provide the background discussion for the lead-up to the war, the initial
cost projections, and the "shell game" the Pentagon and Department of
Defense play with their budgeting and accounting to hid where the
money is going and what it is being spent on. An important point the
authors make is that the recurrent use of "emergency" appropriations to
fund the war has allowed the current Bush administration to make an
end-run around the traditional Congressional budgetary process and
oversight for war-related costs. The authors also outline their basic
framework, steps followed, and the preliminary budgetary
considerations which form the basis for the Chapter Two, "The Costs to
the Nation's Budget." In the several months since The Three Trillion
Dollar War was first published, there have been no substantive
objections to the authors' methodology, numbers, or conclusions.
II. THE THREE DIRECT COMPONENTS OF VETERANS'
CARE COSTS
The author's case-that there are hundreds of billions of
dollars, which have already been spent on veterans' healthcare, and
perhaps another trillion dollars in future expenses-is a strong one.
The structure of the book takes the reader through a detailed analysis of
the true costs of the war, and leads the reader to the discussion of the
healthcare costs for veterans. The cumulative effect of each chapter is
to delineate the expansive nature of the healthcare costs thus far and
predict likely expenses in both "best-case" and "realistic-moderate"
scenarios. The "worst-case" scenarios are left to the reader's
imagination, but even contemplating the reasonable ones should give
everyone pause.
Even if the assumption that much of the war will have "wound
down" by 2012 is correct, by conservative estimates the war will still
have produced approximately 1.8 million veterans. It is this figure-the
total number of deployed personnel-which is critical to any
determination of veterans' future healthcare costs. Every one of these
individuals will be eligible for at least two years of veterans' healthcare
from the Veterans Administration (VA), and all will be eligible to
claim disability compensation from the Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA).
The burden of veterans' healthcare costs is comprised of three
components. First there is the cost of providing medical treatment to
returning veterans. Second is the cost of disability compensation and
2008]
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other benefits they have earned. Third is the separate social security
compensation benefit of $1000/month that any veteran who cannot
work or hold down a job is entitled. For the first two components, the
authors project the likely costs for providing medical treatment to
returning veterans and paying them the disability compensation and
other benefits they have earned; figures are provided for "best case"
and "realistic-moderate" scenarios.
The projected costs for these two major categories of healthcare
costs are enormous. The "best case" scenario involves 1.8 million
personnel through 2012 and estimates that the U.S. government will
pay a total of $398 billion in total long-term costs to the VA system:
$121 billion for veterans' health care and $277 billion in veterans'
disability benefits. Of course, this scenario assumes that only twenty
percent of veterans will use the VA system as their primary healthcare
provider and that only thirty-nine percent of current Gulf War veterans
will eventually qualify for disability benefits at all. Experience from
the last Gulf War strongly suggests that neither of these assumptions is
likely to be true: the repetitive deployments of personnel virtually
guarantee a greater likelihood of serious injury requiring more
extensive medical care, and a greater likelihood of filing disability
claims, particularly for mental health related issues. Again, using data
from the Vietnam War and the first Iraq war, the authors estimate that
forty-five percent or more will ultimately apply for long-term disability
benefits for physical or mental health problems, of which eighty-eight
percent will be approved.
The real healthcare costs are more likely to resemble the
"realistic-moderate" scenario, which involves a larger total of 2.1
million servicemen and a longer active military presence through 2017.
Under this set of circumstances, with 850,000 troops filing disability
claims, the average monthly payment to veterans remaining at $592,
and the current average cost of medical treatment in the VA system
staying constant, the numbers are much higher. Disability
compensation costs are $388 billion and medical care costs $285
billion, for a total long term cost to the U.S. taxpayer of $673 billion. 5
15 STIGLITZ & BILMES, supra note 2, at 40 ("For estimating the future cost of medical
care, we project that 48% of current veterans will eventually seek treatment from the
VA. Of these, we assume that 60 percent will seek short-term treatment (lasting less
than five years) and 40 percent will remain in the system for the rest of their lives.
Both scenarios predict that medical health care inflation will continue to increase at
double the rate of general inflation, as it has for decades.").
[Vol. 11.3:359
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This is essentially the same amount of money, which has been spent on
the current conflict to date.
Ironically, much of our long-term health and disability
obligations from this war are a direct result of the fact that our
battlefield medical care and transportation systems are so good.
Wounds that routinely were fatal even twenty-five years ago during
Vietnam, no longer are. Significant improvements in our military's
medical capabilities have resulted in a much higher ratio of wounded to
killed, than in other wars. 16 This, too, has contributed to the gross
underestimation of the true costs of this war. Also, as the Army's
recent Mental Health Advisory Team V Report indicates, the damage
caused by disruption to soldiers' lives is higher than in previous
conflicts, as demonstrated by elevated suicide rates.
17
III. THE VETERANS' HEALTHCARE MATRIX
As sobering as the costs of providing healthcare and disability
benefits for our veterans will be, the administrative maze veterans have
to go through to obtain benefits is the other harsh reality the authors
describe. The problem of providing medical care for our veterans is
partly due to the bifurcated nature of our system. Veterans must first be
medically processed by the Department of Defense, and only once this
is completed and they are discharged can they be processed by the
Veterans Administration. The process takes time (varying enormously
from state to state);18 the application is twenty-six pages long and
difficult to navigate, and the administrative burden faced by
government officials incomprehensible. In 2000, prior to the current
Iraq war, the backlog of initial compensation claims for the Veterans
Benefits Administration was 228,000, of which 57,000 had been
waiting more than six months. At the end of 2007, the total number of
claims, either new or in the process of adjudicated, exceeded 600,000.19
16 See Department of Defense, available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/
personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm (last accessed April 11, 2008).
17 Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) Report V, at 28 (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.armymedicine.mil/news/mhat/mhatv/Redacted 1-MHATV-OIF-4-FEB-
2008Report.pdf
18 STIGLITZ & BILMES, supra note 2, at 73 ("In a 2005 study, the GAO found that the
time to complete a veteran's claim varied from 99 days at the Salt Lake City office to
237 days in Honolulu. In a 2006 study, GAO found that 12 percent of claims were
inaccurate.").
'9 Id. at 74 ("The VA has announced that it expects to receive another 1.6 million
claims over the next two years."). Has there been a dramatic increase in the number
2008]
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"The True Cost of Caring For Our Veterans" ends with
discussion of the special problems of TBI (Traumatic-Brain Injury),
PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder), and the reality that the
Veterans Health Administration, as fine an institution as it is, 2° is no
match for the sheer numbers of veterans and complexity of their
medical problems. All of this points to the repetitive lack of planning
and business administration capability so characteristic of the Bush
administration.
IV. COSTS VETERANS' FAMILIES, OUR ALLIES, AND
EVERYONE ELSE PAYS
The last half of the book examines the $300-400 billion in
social costs of the Gulf War, which will not be paid by the government,
but which will be directly and indirectly, paid by veterans' families
(Chapter Four "The Costs of War That The Government Doesn't Pay").
Many family members will lose their jobs caring for severely wounded
veterans, even if the maximum benefit package is paid out by the
government because not all medical costs, such as home nursing, are
covered. The financial and emotional toll taken on these families is
enormous.
We should also look at the direct toll of the war on Iraq and the
Iraqi people, the costs to Afghanistan, and the costs to the rest of the
world, particularly to Great Britain and her armed forces (Chapter Five,
"The Macroeconomic Effects of the Conflicts"). Here are some
sobering and depressing facts: aside from the direct cost to the world
economy of over one trillion dollars just from the jump in oil prices as
a result of the war: almost 4.6 million people in Iraq have been
uprooted from their homes, 21 almost 8,000 Iraqi soldiers fighting
alongside U.S. soldiers have been killed,22 sanitation facilities in Iraq
are so bad that there were more cases of cholera in Iraq in 2006 than in
all of the rest of Asia,23 as of July 2006, the number of Iraqi civilian
of VA personnel under the Bush administration to process this anticipated
astronomical number of health claims? No.
20 Id. at 65. Among the veterans who return from Iraq and Afghanistan more than
263,000 have been treated at veterans' medical facilities for a variety of conditions,
more than 100,000 have been treated for mental health conditions, and 52,000 have
been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
21 Id. at 133.
22 Id. at 135.
23 Id. at 137.
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deaths was more than 650,00024 and at its current pace likely to exceed
1 million by 2010 at its current pace, and Iraq now has fewer than half
the number of doctors it had at the beginning of the war2 5 (assuming
there is enough light to find a physician: at present Baghdad gets only
nine hours of electricity per day, less than it had before the war).26
Chapter Six ("Global Consequences") discusses the effects of
the war on the United Kingdom and the manner in which Great Britain
has dealt with its Gulf War veterans. The monetary compensation is
slightly better in the United Kingdom, but "the social costs are similar
to those in the United States. The same pattern in terms of families
who leave jobs to care for wounded soldiers, long waiting times for
care, poor medical conditions that require the families to take up
residence at hospitals, and diminished quality of life for those
thousands left with disabilities.
'
"
27
V. LEAVING IRAQ AND LEARNING FROM OUR
MISTAKES
The Three Trillion Dollar War veers off-message in the next to
last chapter ("Exiting Iraq"); there is little new information in the
authors' dissection of the administration's rationale for either going to
war or continuing to stay in Iraq, and the discussion is at best a
necessary distraction. The final chapter ("Learning from Our Mistakes:
Reforms for the Future") returns to the underlying themes of
transparency of financial costs and expenditures in real time, and
accountability and responsibility for care of our veterans. The first nine
reforms described concern the first, and the second nine concern the
latter. Although space limitations prevent a detailed discussion of each
of the proposed reforms, the gist is that veterans' health care should be
viewed as an entitlement, not as something veterans must "prove"
eligibility for. Cutting red-tape and bureaucratic delays for our
veterans is another focus.
Prior to listing their nine veterans-health related reforms, the
authors make a statement, which seems so self evident it is almost
embarrassing that it has to made: "On one issue, however, almost all
concur: we should treat those who fight for their country well- better
24 STIGLITZ & BILMES supra note 2, at 138.
25 Id. at 136.
26 Id. at 140.
27 Id. at 154.
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than they have been treated by the Bush administration., 28 Or to put it
another way, "we have behaved as if there were a direct conflict of
interest between funding the war and taking care of veterans after they
come home." 29 It's time for everyone to pony up on this one, because
there is no place to run.
28 Id. at 198. See also Tom Philpott, Bitter Split Over Making VA Care Open to All
Veterans, MILITARY UPDATE, June 23, 2007. In 2003, former VA Secretary Anthony
Principi suspended VA benefits for all veterans in Priority Group 8, the lowest
priority group, in order to free up resources for higher-priority veterans, those with
very low income or those disabled. The effect of this ruling was to deny access to care
to almost 400,000 veterans.
29 STIGLITZ & BILMES, supra note 2, at 188.
[Vol. 11.3:359
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